How Combat Effective Was The Spencer? Part II

Part II: Hoover's Gap, June 24^th to June 25^th 1863

Introduction to the Battle, the Tullahoma Campaign - June 23^rd to July 3^rd 1863.

The Tullahoma Campaign was the Union campaign that forced Confederate forces out of Middle Tennessee and captured Chattanooga, the gateway to Georgia.  Started on June 23^rd and ending on July 3^rd 1863, it is considered by many historians as one of the most brilliant maneuver battles of the Civil War^1,4,5.

Since Stones River (December 31^st, 1862 & January 2^nd 1863) Confederate General Braxton Brag had been expecting Union General William S. Rosecrans to move on Chattanooga. Bragg was ready, with cavalry scouting Rosecrans' positions in and around Murfreesboro and his infantry positioned on the Highland Rim, protecting the routes through middle Tennessee to Chattanooga.

Bragg believed Rosecrans would move due south, through Guy's Gap⁴, one of the four passages or “gaps” through the Highland Rim in an attempt to flank Bragg from the Shelbyville defenses. Bragg positioned his strongest corps there under Leonidas Polk to cut Rosecrans off at Guy's Gap. If Rosecrans started advancing down the Manchester Pike through Bell Buckle Gap, Liberty Gap or Hoover's Gap, William Hardee's corps, positioned in the Wartrace-Bell Buckle area, would move aggressively to keep Rosecrans pined in the gaps while Leonidas Polk came in behind Rosecrans to trap the Union army.

Of the four passes, Hoover's Gap was the least defended and considered by Bragg an unlikely target, being 11 miles long and only 20 feet wide in places. Defenses were prepared on the South end of the Gap with scouting forces in place at the North end to spot any Union activity aimed at the Gap^1,4,5.

On June 23^rd Rosecrans started the campaign with four different columns making a series of faints. On the Federal right Stanley with Granger's cavalry fainted toward the town of Shelbyville, which protected Bragg's main supply area in middle Tennessee. On the left, Crittenden fainted toward McMinnville, but got stalled due to all the mud caused by rain which started on the 24^th and continued for 15 straight days. In the middle, McCook moved on Liberty Gap to divert attention away from main effort commanded by Thomas, also in the middle^4,5.

Map of the Tullahoma Campaign

Wilder's Brigade.

John T. Wilder was a foundry owner from Indiana that had originally wanted to buy Henry rifles for his brigade, but was unable to procure any. When Wilder saw a demonstration of the Spencer Rifle by Christian Spencer during a visit to Wilder's camp, he was impressed. He personally contracted with Christian Spencer to deliver 1400 rifles to the men of his brigade, and financed the purchase with a loan drawn on his home town bank. The men of his brigade signed promissory notes to Wilder to pay the purchase price of $35 (three months pay) in installments out of their pay^1,4.  As an interesting aside, the original name of the brigade was the Hatchet Brigade^1,4.  Wilder had a low opinion of the bayonet, so he supplied his men with axes that had 2 foot long handles and a substitute. 

Wilder came to Rosecrans with an idea. Mount his brigade, and use them as mobile infantry, able to move quickly and decisively on the enemy's flanks or rear.  Equip his men with Spencers so when they encountered the enemy they would have the firepower to hit the enemy hard and fast.  Rosecrans liked what he heard. He considered his own cavalry to be inferior to the enemies and believed mounted, well armed infantry as an answer. Sometime in early February 1863 he gave Wilder approval to round up a enough horses for his brigade from Confederate "sympathizers" in the Murfreesboro area.  Wilder placed his order for Spencer sometime before April 1863 and received his rifles on May 15^th 1863.  The brigade spent the next month skirmishing the rebel cavalry in the area to give the men experience with their horses and their new Spencers^1,4. 

Hoovers Gap, The Battle.

On the morning of June 24^th George Thomas' corp started its push down the Manchester Pike to Hoover's Gap. He was spearheaded by Wilder's brigade comprised of 17^th and 72^nd Indiana, 98^th and 123^rd Illinois. The brigade in turn deployed a scouting element of five companies from the 72nd Indiana, lead by Lt Colonel Samuel Kirkpatrick. Only three miles from their starting point, Kirkpatrick quickly ran into pickets from the 1^st Kentucky (Confederate) cavalry. The 1^st Kentucky, J. Russell Butler commanding, was quickly push back through the gap and was unable to stop due to the pressure being applied by Kirkpatrick's men. As a result, the Confederates were unable to occupying any of the defensive positions prepared at in the Gap.  Wilder's men then ran into the 3^rd Kentucky and push them out of the south end of the gap. The brigade moved so quickly and aggressively that the 1^st Kentucky abandoned their regimental colors and left behind a small wagon train to be captured.  At this point Wilder was about seven miles ahead of Thomas's main column^1,4.

Unfortunately for Bragg, Wilder's presence in the Gap was unknown to him until 1pm on the 24^th.  In his official report, Bushrod Johnson, a brigade commander in the area of the gap stated that he first heard of the attack from two local boys who reported union forces in the Gap. The report was shorty verified by the wounded adjutant of the 1^st Kentucky Cavalry. Johnson quickly notified A. P. Stewart, his division commander, who in turn notified William Bate, who's brigade was nearest the Gap.  Bate immediately put the 20^th Tennessee, the 37^th Georgia, Caswell’s Georgia Sharpshooters, and the Eufala Light Artillery on the road to Hoover's Gap. When remnants of the 3^rd Kentucky Cavalry meet up with Bate's force a mile out from camp Bate found out that a considerable Union force was in the Gap. Bate immediately sent back for his remaining regiments^1,4.

The first attack on the Federals in the Gap was by the 20^th Tennessee and the 37^th Georgia as they first reached the gap. They made contact with Wilder's forward scouting element just as they were moving south out of the Gap. This element quickly retreated back to Gap exit to let Wilder know the Rebels were coming.

Wilder prepared his defense. Part of the 98^th Illinois was to left of the Manchester Pike, the road through the gap, anchoring on a small hill on that side of the road. The rest of the unit was formed as a reserve. On the right of the road the 72^nd Indiana was placed on a hill that contained a small grave yard, now the Beach Grove Confederate cemetery. Two mountain howitzers were placed in the front of the hill in support and Captain Eli Lilly’s battery of Rodman rifled cannon anchored the center from rise just to the rear of the main line, and were supported by the 123^rd Illinois, to the right of the 72^nd. The 17^th Indiana was to the right of the 123^rd Illinois. The reserve was formed up behind the 123^rd Illinois^1,4,5.

Wilder was determined not to surrender the Gap. He was also in a lot of trouble, having exceeded his orders by taking the Gap in the first place and refusing to fall back when ordered by his division commander. He was convinced he could hold the Gap against any comers until the main force reached him. As he would remember four decades later^1,2,4,5:

"Captain Rice, adjutant-general of the division, came riding speedily to the front with orders from General Reynolds to me to fall back immediately, as the division was six or eight miles in our rear, having stopped to repair a bridge, without letting me know of it. I told him I would hold this position against any force, and to tell General Reynolds to come on without hurrying, as there was no danger of our being driven out of the position. Capt. Rice repeated his order for me to fall back, and I told him I would take the responsibility of remaining where I was, and that if General Reynolds were on the ground he would not give such an order. Capt. Rice said that he had no discretion in the matter, and that if I did not obey the order he would put me in arrest and give the command to Colonel Miller, who would fall back as ordered. I declined to obey the order of arrest, and requested Captain Rice to return to General Reynolds and tell him we had driven their force back, and could not be driven by any forces that could come at us."

Once all his brigade was gathered, Bate organized an attack. It started with fire from Eufala's and Maney’s batteries, killing two gunners and all the mules with one of the Union howitzers. Counter battery fire from Lilly's battery responded, destroying one gun of the Confederate battery and forcing the rest to better protected positions. The 20^th Tennessee and Caswell’s Battalion next attacked trying to flank the 17^th Indiana in its right. Wilders reserve companies moved to 17^th Indiana's right flank where they got there just in time to unleash a “tornado of death” from their Spencers at a range of about 100 yards forcing the Confederates to hit the ground and crawl back to safety^1,4.

Later in the day another was attack directed at Lilly’s battery. Two Confederate regiments, the 20^th Tennessee and 37^th Georgia attacked, but were checked by withering fire from three companies of the 123^rd Illinois concealed in a ravine. This deadly fire was augmented by flanking fire from the 72^nd Indiana from the cemetery. Wilder would later say: “no human being could successfully face the avalanche of destruction” that was raking the attacking units. The battered Confederate were forced to withdrew again^1,4.

By late in the day Bate would be joined by Bushrod Johnson's brigade where together they try one more assault on Wilder before the end of the day. The result was the same as this attack was stopped with deadly fire from Wilder's Spencer armed troops. By 7:00pm on the 24^th, Wilder was joined by Rousseau and Brannan's divisions of Thomas' Corps. The next day (the 25^th) there was some more skirmishing and artillery exchanges through out the day while union forces gathered for the next push.  By noon on the 26^th, Bate and Johnson were ordered by Stewart to rejoin the division.  They were falling back toward Tullahoma.  Union forces followed with Wilder's men again leading the way^1,4,5,6,7,8.

It was a tragic couple of days for Bate. In his Official Report, Bate estimated that his casualties at almost 25%. with 24 killed and 124 wounded. Wilder came off better with 12 killed and 47 wounded, but more importantly he held the Gap.  Its not know what Bushrod Johnson's losses were, but after the battle, over 200 Rebel casualties (killed and wounded) were found on the ground after the battle^1,4,5,7.

The victory at Hoover's Gap was the key to the success of Tullahoma campaign. Forcing the gap allowed Rosecrans to flank Bragg out of the formidable Shelbyville fortifications and push him back to Tullahoma. Later on the 26^th, Wilder's brigade would lead the push into Manchester, again allowing Rosecrans to flank Bragg out of Tullahoma and out of middle Tennessee.

Summary

Tactics Used by Wilder in Hoover's Gap

So once in combat how did Wilder's men use their Spencers? There is no evidence that his men used the weapon in any special or novel way, other then using its tremendous firepower. Bate's attacks on the 17^th Indiana’s flank and the later attack on Lilly's guns in the center were thrown back by this devastating firepower. Besides this, Wilder's men deployed and fought as they had when armed with muzzle loaders, as their foes were so armed at the gap.

Having the Spencer's firepower provided Wilder's men with tremendous confidence.  That in turn provided Wilder with the conviction that his men could hold against anything.  After all he disobeyed a direct order to withdraw because of his confidence that the brigade would hold. One more point worth noting, the entire Tullahoma campaign was fought in record rainfall.  The water-proof metallic cartridge of the Spencer had a decisive advantage over muzzle-loader paper cartridges in the rain and mud.

Wilder's men had two important weapons with them for the campaign, their Spencers and their mobility from being mounted.  Mobility provided Wilder the means to put the enemy to flight and keep him off balance all the way down the Gap.  The Spencer provided devastating advantage once Wilder deployed defensively in the south end of the Gap.

So Was the Spencer a “Game Changer” at Hoover's Gap?

I would have to say half a game changer. In my opinion it was the fact that Wilder's brigade was mounted that made success at Hoover's gap possible. It is undeniable that the brigade's Spencers were decisive in holding the Gap against the numerous Confederate attacks once Wilder was actually in position, but it is very likely that given the superb defensive terrain in the Gap, Wilder's men could have held it even equipped with their old muzzle-loading rifles.  Although certainly the brigade would have suffered many more casualties and perhaps would have been so depleted by battle's end as to be useless for the rest of the campaign.  The two elements together, being mounted and armed with Spencers, made Wilder's unit a game-changing unit, and provided the Union with victory at Hoover's Gap.

Despite disobeying orders, Wilder was congratulated by his superiors for holding the Gap. The next day Rosecrans issued a General Order changing the name of the brigade to the Lighting Brigade⁴.  Beats Hatchet Brigade any day.

The next post in this series will be on The Battle of Olustee, February 20th 1864 . So stay tuned for "How Combat Effective Was The Spencer?  Part III: The Battle of Olustee"

References

1 - Lightning at Hoover's Gap, Sunderland, Glenn W.
2 - Battle of Hoover's Gap, Wikipedia.
3 - Battle of Hoover's Gap, Civil War Wiki.net
4 - The Tullahoma Campaign, AOTC Net.
5 - Tullahoma: The 1863 Campaign for the Control of Middle Tennessee, Bradley, Michael R.
6 - The American Civil War, Griess, Thomas E.
7 - Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns, Woodworth, Steven E.
8 - Battle at Hoover’s Gap key to Chattanooga, Shirley Farris Jones.  The Murfreesboro Post.