How Combat Effective Was The Spencer? Part I

Part I: Tactics Used by Spencer Armed Infantry and Cavalry

Even though the Spencer was an officially adopted weapon no officially sanctioned tactical doctrine existed for the effective use of the weapon. Given the lack of official direction it was up to company, regimental and brigade commanders to evolve their own tactics and doctrine in the school of combat.

Infantry:

Tactical doctrine for Spencer armed infantry units was a bit more problematic than those cavalry units armed with the weapon. Other than its obvious ability to fire a great number of rounds, it wasn't immediately apparent to field commanders trained to use Hardee's Light Infantry tactics where this weapon fit into their existing tactical practice. After trial and error in the field a few innovative commanders came up with a few interesting tricks.

Many tactical applications involved the repeater as a shock weapon, deploying troops with repeaters at critical points in order to pour a flood of lead down on an attacking enemy. The Lightning Brigade was reputed to be capable of firing 160,000 rounds of ammunition in 5 minutes^1,2.

One of the more interesting tactics developed in the field was to use Spencer or Henry armed troops to deliver a sustained volley of fire on the enemy^1,2, say one shot every 2 to 3 seconds. If delivering the volley by rank (one rank firing while the other rank loads), a company size (100 man) unit, could sustain a rate of fire ~ 1200 rounds a minute for 6.5 minutes at 80 rounds per man and interestingly at a rate of fire higher than most modern machine guns. In contrast a unit armed with the 1861 Springfield would require more than 400 men to sustain the same rate of fire and at that they would be firing as fast as they could load and shoot. Our 100 man Spencer armed unit could keep up this same rate of fire easily and quickly increase it if needed.

Another trick practiced by repeater armed units would entail firing volleys at a rate consistent to muzzle loading troops in order to deceive the enemy in believing they were facing a conventionally armed unit. The enemy would then attack between volleys under the impression that the repeater unit was reloading and thus unable to fire on the advancing unit, only to be cut down by a hail of lead sprayed from the muzzles of Spencer or Henry armed units¹.

By far though the most common use of Spencer (and Henry) armed units were as skirmishers¹. Skirmishers armed with repeaters could lay down fire at a rate that would fool the enemy in believing that there were many more men to their front than were actually present.

Cavalry:

Cavalry used the Spencer in many of the same ways as Spencer armed infantry units with the additional advantage that the cavalry's basic mission required that the officers and men practice a more aggressive and mobility-orientated mind set than most Infantry units, with the emphasis being on maneuver, concentration, and shock through firepower. By late 1862 most Union and many Confederate units, were already armed with breech loading firearms capable of a 5 to 6 round per minute rate of fire that was double the rate of a musket armed infantryman. Arming units with Spencers provided that final capability that would allow the mounted arm to fully express its potential, as best expressed by Nathan Bedford Forest's aphorism to “get there the fastest with the mostest” and I might add with the best firepower available.

By the war's end Union cavalry, armed with Spencers, aggressively trained and lead by innovative commanders such as James H Wilson, Edward McCook, and Emory Upton would pull off the war's most impressive mobile attack, Wilson's raid on Selma³. It would be 75 years before German panzer units would pull off operations as mobile and impressive as the Selma raid.

Summary

Although there was not an official doctrine available to repeater armed infantry units, commanders in the field found effective and innovative ways to gain advantage from their Spencers. These units would often provided a critical advantage to the army that could most effectively utilize them, contributing significantly to that army's success.  It is certain that had the war lasted an additional year an effective tactical doctrine would have been developed for Spencer armed infantry units.

Cavalry units were better able to deployed the Spencer effectively in part because these units were already well practiced in a tactical doctrine in which allowed the Spencer to be efficiently deployed.  The Spencer provided cavalry units with that final piece to the puzzle that allowed them to pull off mobile operations that would not be surpassed until the blitzkrieg of 1940.

The final word on the effectiveness of the Spencer and the Henry belongs to General Porter Alexander, Lee's Artillery Commander, the Army of Northern Virginia, who pointed out that had the Union adopted repeaters in large numbers, the war would have ended within a year or two at the most².

The next post in this series will be on Hoovers Gap battle and John Wilder's "Lighting Brigade".  So stay tuned for "How Combat Effective Was The Spencer?  Part II: Hoover's Gap"

References 

1. Bresnan, Andrew L. The Henry Repeating Rifle, Chapter 3: The Henry, Spencer and Their Tactics. RareWinchesters.com
2. Bilby, Joe. The Spencer, Then. RareWinchesters.com
3. Starr, Stephen Z. Cavalry Tactics in the Civil War. Cincinnati Civil War Round Table, April 26th 1959.