How Combat Effective Was The Spencer? Part III

Part III: Battle of Olustee February 20th, 1864 

Introduction

The Battle of Olustee was the climax of a union Union campaign started in February 1864 with the objective being the occupation Jacksonville and Central Florida. The goal of the campaign was the interdiction of needed food supplies and timber available in central Florida, recruit black soldiers for the army and encourage east Florida Unionists to organize a loyal state government. 

The Union commander was Truman Seymour, a veteran of the Army of the Potomac's V Corps who participated in most of the critical battles of 1862. In late 1862 he was transferred to the Department of the South where he served as chief of staff and participated in the first attempt to take Battery Wagner the battle that made the 54th Massachusetts famous. Seriously wounded during the engagement by artillery he was placed on sick leave until given command of the District of the South in early 1864. 

Sailing from Hilton Head, SC, Seymour's army landed at Jacksonville on February 7, 1864 to little opposition. Once established in Jacksonville, he then pushed into west Florida. 

Seymour's movements were well know by the Confederates; Union fleet movements were routinely noted by the Confederate observers in the Hilton Head area. A defense was organized and placed in the hands of Joseph Finegan and Alfred Colquitt, with Finegan in command. 

Joseph Finegan had been put in command of Middle and East Florida in April 1982 where he remained through out the war until after Olustee where he was transferred to command of the Florida Brigade in the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Once alerted to Union movements into Central Florida, Finegan decided to position his army at Olustee, Florida in a the cut where the only railroad in the area was located. Bounded on one side by Lake Ocean Pond and on the other by a nearly impassable swamp, he believed the narrow passage between would be an ideal killing ground for his somewhat smaller army.

The Battle

February 20, 1864 the Union force, comprised of 5,500 men (including at least 800 Spencer armed men distributed across the 7th Connecticut & the 7th New Hampshire and the 40th Massachusetts, mounted) and 16 cannon marched westward from MacClenny, Florida. 

When he was informed early on the 20th by scouts and sympathetic locals of the Union Army's move westward, Finegan sent skirmishers out to draw the Union forces toward his prepared positions at Olustee. The battle started early on the 20th of February with skirmishing between the two armies starting a few miles west of Sanderson FL. Union and Southern cavalry scouts fought a running skirmish with the Confederates slowly withdrawing westward towards Olustee, ten miles east of Lake City. Finegan hoped to draw the Federals all the way to his prepared positions in the railroad corridor, but Confederate resistance stiffened early, slowing Union forces as they approach Olustee. Finegan was forced to send reinforcements from his prepared positions forward to the units already engaged. The Union commander fed more of his units into the battle in response. 

First the 64th Georgia and part the the 32nd Georgia were sent in to back up the rebel cavalry fighting the Union advance units. These were quickly followed by the 6th Georgia, 9th Georgia and 28th Georgia along with Gamble's Florida Artillery. General Alfred Colquitt had tactical command of the forward units, with Finegan commanding the main body 2 miles behind Colquitt. 

With these reinforcements Colquitt quickly drove the forward Union units back. In response Union general Seymour brought forward the 7th Connecticut, along with the 7th New Hampshire and the 8th USCT.

7th Connecticut and 7th New Hampshire were veterans of the warfare along the southern coast. Prior to deployment with Seymour they were both armed with Spencer rifles and had plenty of experience with them. But when the 7th New Hampshire arrived in Florida a third of its companies were forced to give up their beloved Spencers to the 40th Massachusetts (Mounted) for older mostly non-functional Springfield muskets, most without bayonets. The 7th Connecticut had their Spencers, but much of the regiment was on leave. Both regiments had a large number of untrained substitutes in poor physical condition. 

The 7th Connecticut deployed as skirmishers and were quickly engaged. They held well, but their ammunition ran out quickly and had to withdrawal, leaving the rest of the brigade uncovered. The brigade's commander, Colonel Hawley was attempting at the time to position the 7th New Hampshire & 8th USCT in line when conflicting orders were issues to the 7th New Hampshire. The untrained and no doubt terrified new members of the unit quickly got confused and collapsed, putting the 8th United States Colored Troops, which occupied the left of the Union line, in an exposed position. The 8th was also an untried and largely untrained unit, having been organized only months before. The 8th USCT's Colonel Charles Fribley tried to steady his men and for a short time succeeded, but he soon fell mortally wounded. The raw troops of the 8th held their ground for a time, suffering more than 300 casualties. Finally they retreated in some confusion, leaving the Union batteries supporting these units to be captured. 

With the dissolution of Hawley's Brigade, Colquitt ordered Confederate forces to advance into the gap. Since the beginning, Finegan had been sending additional reinforcements into the battle (the 6th Florida Battalion; the 1st, 23rd, 27th, 32nd Georgia Regiments, and the Chatham Artillery) to Colquitt's allowing Confederate lines to extend for about one mile, north to south. Seymour ordered Colonel William Barton's Brigade, consisting of the 47th, 48th and115th New York forward in hopes of matching the deployed Rebel units and stabilizing the situation. These units succeeded for a time with battle lines stabilizing temporarily.

The fighting at this point was particularly severe. Confederates captured several Union artillery pieces and threatened to overwhelm the Federal infantry, but at a critical moment Confederate units ran low on ammunition, stalling the effort. Several Southern units held their place in line despite being completely out of ammunition and suffered for it. Eventually ammunition was brought forward from the rear accompanied by the remaining Confederate reserves (1st Florida Battalion and Bonaud's Battalion). 

Re-supplied and reinforced, the Confederates again began advancing. By late in the day General Seymour realized the battle was lost. The New York regiments having fought themselves out withdrawing. To prevent a rout and to cover his retreat, he sent forward his last reserves, Colonel James Montgomery's Brigade, which consisted of the 35th United States Colored Troops and the famous 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. Montgomery formed the core of the defense around a resupplied 7th Connecticut and the rallied veteran core of the 7th New Hampshire. Montgomery's Brigade stopped the Confederates push long enough to enable Seymour to withdraw his surviving forces. One white veteran's at the battle said of Montgomery's Brigade "The colored troops went in grandly, and they fought like devils". 

By dusk, the Union forces had begun the long road back to Jacksonville. The 54th Massachusetts, the Federal cavalry, and part of the7th Connecticut continued to cover the withdrawal. In the words of Colonel Barton in his official report “We at first retired by alternate battalions, covered by the Seventh Connecticut Volunteers, deployed as skirmishers, in our rear, they, in turn being covered by the cavalry, mounted infantry, and Horse Battery B, [First] U.S. Artillery and the 40th Massachusetts Mounted Infantry.” The withdrawal took place between six and seven o’clock with many wounded and a lot of equipment being left behind in the hasty Federal retreat. The Confederate pursuit was poorly conducted, enabling most Federals to escape. By February 22, Seymour's battered army was back in Jacksonville. 

The casualties at Olustee were staggering given the units engaged. Each side had about 5,000 men present. Union casualties were 203 killed, 1,152 wounded, and 506 missing,a total of 1,861. Confederate losses were 93 killed, 847 wounded, and 6 missing, a total of 946. A 40% casualty rate for the Federals and 20% rate for the Confederates. The 47th New York had 313 casualties and the 8th U.S.C.T. had 310. Among the Confederate units, the 32nd Georgia lost 164 men and Bonaud's Battalion 107. For the North, the casualty percentage was among the highest of the war, and Olustee ranks as the third bloodiest for the Union given the number of Federals on the field. Letters and diaries from the men involved indicate that the battle was as savage as any in Eastern or the Western theaters. 

The Aftermath 

Defeat thwarted Federal efforts to form a Unionist government in Florida in time for the 1864 election, but the expedition's military objectives were basically successful. Jacksonville remained in Union hands until the end of the war, keeping the port open for commerce and of course tariff revenues. Union occupation disrupted the supply of the foodstuffs that Florida supplied to the rest of the Confederacy. Of course, all of this could have been accomplished by the occupation of Jacksonville and without the nearly 2,000 casualties suffered at Olustee. 

Disgracefully after the battle, Confederate soldiers brutally mistreated Union black soldiers captured and wounded on the field. Confederate Contemporary sources indicate that a number of black soldiers were killed on the battlefield by roaming bands of southern troops following the close of the fighting. 

Conclusion 

Despite having 800 men armed with Spencers, the weapon's presence had no effect on the battle. As mentioned, instead of leaving the Spencer in the hands of units that had at least some experience with the weapon, Union command decided to distribute many of the available Spencers to other units – namely the 40th Massachusetts (mounted), spreading out the Spencer's firepower without any corresponding tactical advantage. I've not seen anything published anywhere as to why this was done. One theory is that the Union command structure hopped that spreading out their fire power would strengthen the army as a whole. A second theory is that by giving Spencers to a mounted unit, that units striking power would increase and Seymour would have his own Lightening Brigade in miniature and indeed the 40th was one of the units that covered the withdrawal of the Federal army. 

Regardless of the reasons, the net effect was to take Spencers away from men familiar with them and give them to men unfamiliar with them. 

The 7th Connecticut was at the time of Olustee a very under strength unit. In January 1864 300 of the regiments veterans were furloughed as a reward for re-enlisting. These men were missing at Olustee and would be sorely missed. Approximately 112 draftees and hired substitutes joined the unit in late 1863, but these men did not make up for the missing veterans and were generally in poor shape and of poor quality. The regiment mustered less than 300 men for the battle. The impact of the new recruits' inexperience was evident early in the battle when the regiment quickly ran out of ammunition, a sure sign that most of its men had no real experience with the Spencer. The unit made up for this later in the battle by credibly covering the Federal army's retreat. 

The 7th New Hampshire was in a similar situation with the additional handicap of having their Spencers taken from them and replaced by useless Springfield’s. As a result of this, the new recruits with the unit and the confused commands issued during the battle to the regiment, the unit quickly broke early in the battle, although latter some of the veterans of the unit rallied with the 7th Connecticut and successfully covered the Union Army's withdrawal. 

So – did the Spencer have an impact on this battle? The answer must be a resounding no. Poor tactical use of Spencer armed units and poor coordination by the Union commander during the battle negated any positive effect the weapon would have had on the outcome of the battle. Even massed, I doubt it would have had any real effect on the outcome of the Campaign, the sides were too evenly matched and the Confederate forces had too much experience and were too motivated to stop the federals for the Campaign to be a success. 

It is interesting to note that this tactic of spreading out firepower was attempted almost 80 years latter by the French in 1940 when they distributed their tanks in small units through out their army in hope that the additional firepower would strengthen the defence. The result was even more of a disaster than Olustee with the Germans, having massing their tank formations together, cutting through the French army with ease, even though French tanks were individually superior to their German counterparts. 

The next post in this series will be on The Battle of Nashville, December 15th & 16th 1864 . So stay tuned for "How Combat Effective Was The Spencer?  Part IV: The Battle of Nashville"

References

 1 - Abraham J. Palmer, The history of the Forty-eighth Regiment, New York State Volunteers, in the War for the Union, 1861-1865 (1885.) p. 133.
 2 - 47Th New York Volunteer Infantry Page
 3 - 48Th New York Volunteer Infantry Page
 4 - 115Th New York Volunteer Infantry Page
 5 - James H. Clark, The Iron Hearted Regiment: Being an Account of the Battles, Marches and Gallant Deeds Performed by the 115th N. Y. Vols. (1865) p. 88.
 6 - A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, By Bvt. Lieut. Col. Robert N. Scott, Published Pursuant Act of Congress Approved June 16, 1880. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880) Series I Vol. 35 Part I p. 302.
 7 - New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center, NYS Division of Military and Naval Affairs. Olustee, James Finelli, The University at Albany
 8 - Battle of Olustee. Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Olustee)
 9 - 7th New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry
 10 - The Battle of Olustee Web Site
 11 - Joseph Finegan Bio
 12 - Truman Seymour Bio